

CONTENTS

	<i>page</i>
<i>List of figures and tables</i>	xi
<i>Contributors</i>	xiii
I. Introduction. Dialogue as a Method	
<i>Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G. Carozza, Marta Cartabia, and Andrea Simoncini</i>	1
1.1. Relationality as the hallmark of the Italian Style of constitutional adjudication	3
1.2. Relationality revisited	11
1.2.1. Relationality vs. weakness: perception and reality	12
1.2.2. Relationality “unpacked”	14
1.2.3. Official vs. Unofficial relationality	16
1.3. Dialogue as a method	18
1.4. Relationality and constitutional pluralism	19
Dialogue I	
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP	
II. <i>Je t’aime ... moi non plus</i>: Some Considerations on (and Impressions of) the Relationships between Constitutional Justice and Legal Scholarship	
<i>Paolo Passaglia</i>	27
2.1. The difficulties encountered during research	27
2.2. The semi-direct sources	28
2.3. The indirect sources	30
2.4. Implied sources	34
2.5. Reasons (and prospects) for the absence of direct sources	37
2.6. An impression, not a conclusion	41
III. <i>The Wasp and the Orchid</i>: Constitutional Justice and Legal Scholarship Need Each Other	
<i>Marc Verdussen</i>	45
3.1. The influence of legal scholarship on constitutional justice	45

	<i>page</i>
3.1.1. Semi-direct sources	46
3.1.2. Indirect sources	47
3.1.3. Implied sources	50
3.2. The perception of constitutional justice by legal scholarship	52
3.2.1. The perception of the constitutional court itself	52
3.2.2. The perception of constitutional case law	53
3.3. The destinies of constitutional justice and legal scholarship are more intertwined than ever before	57

Dialogue II

OPEN AND CLOSED FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

IV. Openness and Transparency in Constitutional Adjudication: *Amici Curiae*, Third-Party Intervention, and Fact-Finding Powers

<i>Tania Groppi and Anna Maria Lecis Cocco Ortu</i>	63
4.1. The legislative and autonomous framework	64
4.2. Third-parties and <i>amici curiae</i> : case-law and scholarly debate	68
4.2.1. The established case-law on third-party interventions	69
4.2.2. The scholarly debate on <i>amici curiae</i> briefs	71
4.3. Case-law and scholarly debate on fact-finding	75
4.4. Conclusion	79
4.5. <i>Post scriptum</i> : “The Court Opens to Hearing the Voice of Civil Society”	80

V. Procedural Rules and the Cultivation of Well-Informed and Responsive Constitutional Judiciaries

<i>Maartje De Visser</i>	83
5.1. Benefits, risks and challenges of ‘open’ constitutional adjudication	84
5.2. Designing for participation-friendly constitutional litigation and well-rounded judicial deliberations	91
5.3. Of hermeneutics and legal formants	99
5.4. Concluding thoughts	102

Dialogue III

THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLEGIALITY

VI. Collegiality Over Personality: The Rejection of Separate Opinions in Italy

<i>Diletta Tega</i>	107
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	<i>page</i>
6.1. The meaning of the collegiality principle and its repercussions on separate opinions	107
6.2. The Constitutional Court's position: preservation of the <i>status quo</i>	111
6.3. Pros and cons: the debate among scholars	117
6.4. Conclusion	119
VII. "Collegiality" in Comparative Context	
<i>Sarah Harding</i>	123
7.1. A spectrum of collegiality	127
7.2. Dialogue and legal development	133
7.3. Institutional legitimacy	137
7.4. Conclusion	140
Dialogue IV	
ACCESS TO CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION	
VIII. Direct Constitutional Complaint and <i>Italian Style</i> do not Match. Why Is That?	
<i>Elisabetta Lamarque</i>	143
8.1. The fairy tale of the Constitutional Court in the Italian Constituent Assembly: <i>Aesop's sheep</i> or <i>Cinderella</i> ?	143
8.2. Constitutional Court and the judiciary: <i>it takes two to tango</i>	148
8.3. The direct complaint according to the Constitutional Court: a superfluous instrument?	150
8.4. The direct complaint within constitutional literature. A rarefied yet not a sterile debate	157
IX. The Potential Virtues and Risks of Abstract Constitutional Challenges and Individual Complaints: Some Reflections from Spain	
<i>Victor Ferreres Comella</i>	165
9.1. Constitutional challenges: a powerful weapon	167
9.2. Constitutional challenges: problems with time	170
9.3. Constitutional challenges and the risk of politicization	173
9.4. Constitutional complaints to safeguard fundamental rights	174
9.5. Conclusion	178

Dialogue V

JUDICIAL REASONING AND INTERPRETATION

X. Forms and Methods of Constitutional Interpretation – Italian Style

<i>Giorgio Pino</i>	181
10.1. Constitutional interpretation in contemporary Italian legal culture	181
10.2. The nature of constitutional norms	182
10.2.1. Constitutional norms vs. constitutional programs	183
10.2.2. Constitutional rules, principles, and values	185
10.3. Constitutional interpretation and conceptions of the constitution	189
10.3.1. The defensive constitution	190
10.3.2. The foundational constitution	192
10.3.2.1. The principle-based model	195
10.3.2.2. The value-based model	197
10.4. Taking stock	200

XI. The Relationship between Forms and Methods in Constitutional Interpretation: Comparative Reflections

<i>Jeffrey A. Pojanowski</i>	203
11.1. Constitutional norms and interpretive choice	204
11.2. Choosing among interpretive choices	212
11.3. Conclusion	217

Dialogue VI

NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT

XII. The Italian Constitutional Court in the European Space: An Empirical Approach

<i>Marta Infantino</i>	221
12.1. A story of opening up	222
12.2. The quantitative experiment: process and caveats	224
12.3. A year in numbers	226
12.3.1. The demand side for Europeanisation	227
12.3.2. Judicial encounters with European legal orders	230
12.4. European relationality at work	232

	<i>page</i>
12.4.1. Pride and boundary-marking	233
12.4.2. Respect and sensibility	235
12.4.3. Persuasion and resistance	237
12.4.4. A qualitative test for dialogue	239
12.5. Conclusion	243
XIII. European Relationality in the European Legal Space: Country-Specific Mixtures within One European Style	
<i>Patricia Popelier</i>	245
13.1. Relationality in the European legal space: an Italian feature, or a European device?	245
13.2. The Belgian Constitutional Court's approach towards the European courts in 2016	247
13.2.1. The demand side for Europeanisation	248
13.2.2. Judicial encounters with European legal orders	250
13.2.3. European relationality at work in 2016	253
13.3. The Belgian Constitutional Court's approach towards the European courts in the long term	254
13.3.1. Respect	254
13.3.2. Pride	256
13.3.3. Resistance	257
13.4. Conclusion	258
CONCLUSION	
XIV. Power Is Perfected in Weakness: On the Authority of the Italian Constitutional Court	
<i>Armin von Bogdandy and Davide Paris</i>	263
14.1. The idea of "strength in weakness"	263
14.2. Limited access	267
14.3. Low profile	269
14.4. Adverse environment	274
14.5. Playing poker	278
<i>Index</i>	281